Claude Compliance API supportForceAI Security Announces Support for Claude Compliance API
ForceAI Pinesmith
ForceAI Pinesmith protects prompts, responses, files, code, tool calls, and agent actions while AI is being used. Ensure strict security posture management, continuous monitoring, assessment, and improvement of the security properties of target AI applications.
Posture Monitoring
Live AI-SPM Stream
Design-Time Hardening
Prevent unsafe architectures from reaching production
System Prompt Hygiene
Externalize authorization logic. Ensure no secrets (credentials/keys) are placed in system prompts.
Prompt Fuzzer
Repeatable adversarial testing simulating direct/indirect injection and RAG poisoning.
Agent Trace Validation
Eval-driven trace graders to ensure untrusted data never drives agent behavior directly.
Measurable Outcomes
- Reduction in 'AI tool unknowns'
- Pre-deployment secrets detection
- Vulnerability remediation pre-commit
LLM-Agnostic Gateway
Govern the Toolchain: MCP Gateway
The Model Context Protocol (MCP) enables powerful capabilities but requires implementers to address user consent and tool safety. ForceAI acts as an **MCP Gateway** to translate agent autonomy into bounded, auditable execution.
Explicit consent required for every tool invocation, preventing session hijacking.
Arguments are validated against schemas before execution to prevent command injection.
Uncover the Invisible Agent Workforce
Shadow AI is no longer just unmanaged ChatGPT accounts. It's unmanaged copilots, unauthorized browser extensions, and custom GPTs accessing corporate data via shadow API keys.
Identify where 3rd party copilots are accessing internal repositories and data lakes without SOC oversight.
Detect and neutralize leaked or unauthorized LLM provider keys found in employee-driven automation scripts.
OWASP Risk-to-Control Mapping
| Risk Category | Operational Failure | AI SPM Control | Audit Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| LLM01 Prompt Injection | Untrusted content (email/docs) triggers unsafe tool calls | Run-time: Deterministic safeguards + Tool allowlists | Contains 'confused deputy' behavior as a residual risk |
| LLM06 Sensitive Info Disclosure | PII/Secrets leak into prompts or logs via excessive agency | Secure: DLP-style redaction independent of prompt instructions | Enforces policy even if model instructions are bypassed |
| LLM08 Excessive Agency | Unchecked autonomy via powerful tool-connected paths | Build: Least-privilege scoping; Run: Explicit consent for tool invocation | Translates autonomy into bounded, auditable delegation |
| LLM02 Insecure Output Handling | Output becomes executable input for downstream systems | Run-time: Argument/Schema validation + Human-in-the-loop | Reduces RCE and privilege escalation risks in workflows |